Unpredictability and Uncertainty in Anxiety: A New Direction for Emotional Timing Research by Jessica I. Lake & Kevin S. LaBar
INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Unpredictability and uncertainty in anxiety: a new direction for 
emotional timing research
Jessica I. Lake1,2* and Kevin S. LaBar1,2
1 Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
2 Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
*Correspondence: jessica.lake@duke.edu
Interest in the relationship between emo-
tion and time perception has noticeably 
increased in the past few years (Buhusi and 
Meck, 2005; Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; 
Craig, 2009; Droit-Volet et al., 2011). Most 
of this recent work has used emotional 
stimuli, such as faces (e.g., Droit-Volet 
et al., 2004; Tipples, 2008), pictures (e.g., 
Angrilli et al., 1997; Grommet et al., 2011), 
and sounds (e.g., Noulhaine et al., 2007) to 
understand how emotion can change the 
subjective experience of short intervals of 
time. Efforts have largely focused on deter-
mining what these findings reveal about 
how time can be distorted and identifying 
the mechanisms responsible for flexibly 
modulating these distortions. In this issue, 
Schirmer (2011) reviews various theories 
that attempt to explain the mechanisms 
underlying emotional influences on time 
perception and proposes a hybrid theory to 
better support findings in the field. Further 
research will be necessary to support or con-
tradict the proposed mechanistic influences 
of emotion on timing. While the value of 
this work is clear, it is equally important 
to address how timing research can inform 
affective science and affective disorders, 
a question that has thus far received little 
attention within the field. Specifically, a 
better understanding of how time is per-
ceived in anxiety-provoking contexts could 
be important in fully appreciating the pro-
cesses underlying the experience of anxiety.
Many of the first studies of time per-
ception and anxiety analyzed estimates 
of elapsed time under stressful conditions 
(e.g., Langer et al., 1961; Hare, 1963; Watts 
and Sharrock, 1984; Loftus et al., 1987). 
While these studies consistently reported 
overestimation of time and were ecologi-
cally relevant, they were limited in that they 
relied on small numbers of trials and ret-
rospective reports, which have been argued 
to reflect memory, rather than timing, pro-
cesses per se (Zakay, 1990). Using standard-
ized emotional stimuli such as pictures and 
film clips, more recent studies have added 
support to the idea that increased fear and 
anxiety are correlated with the overesti-
mation of time intervals (e.g., Droit-Volet 
et al., 2011; Grommet et al., 2011). At the 
same time, recent work on anxiety and 
related disorders has focused on the role of 
ambiguity (e.g., Nader and Balleine, 2007; 
Shankman et al., 2011; Zweifel et al., 2011). 
Using work on timing and time perception 
to address the influence of ambiguity on 
anxiety could provide a unique perspective 
from which to further advance our under-
standing of these clinical disorders.
Anxiety is defined as a state of prolonged 
fear or arousal in response to a threat that is 
ambiguous or unspecific (Lang et al., 2000). 
Ambiguity refers to a situation or context in 
which a threat may take various forms, and 
different predictions and behaviors based on 
these predictions may subsequently occur 
(Whalen, 1998). Temporal unpredictability 
(ambiguity in when an event will occur) and 
probabilistic uncertainty (ambiguity in how 
likely an event is to occur) are two types of 
threat ambiguity. Human and non-human 
animal studies suggest that both unpredict-
ability and uncertainty modulate anxiety-
like behaviors and activity in brain regions 
associated with anxiety (Hsu et al., 2005; 
Rosen and Donley, 2006; Herry et al., 2007).
Most studies showing an increase in 
anxiety associated with temporal unpredict-
ability have used paradigms involving antic-
ipation of negative emotional events (e.g., 
Grillon et al., 2006). Note that this approach 
contrasts with typical time perception stud-
ies in which emotion is manipulated pha-
sically through alterations in the sensory 
features of a stimulus whose duration is 
to be timed. In Grillon et al. (2004), anxi-
ety was operationally defined as the mag-
nitude of a startle response (Brown et al., 
1951) during cue-free periods within an 
aversive conditioning paradigm (context-
potentiated startle). Context-potentiated 
startle was greater when surrounding cues 
were not predictive of when aversive events 
occurred (i.e., aversive events were perceived 
as occurring randomly) compared to cue-
free periods within the context of cues that 
reliably predicted the temporal occurrence 
of aversive events. Simply cuing previously 
unpredictable shocks also reduces context-
potentiated startle responses (Fonteyne 
et al., 2010). Together, these findings suggest 
that temporal unpredictability increases 
anxiety levels. The aversive nature of unpre-
dictability is further supported by studies 
showing that animals prefer to receive pre-
dictable over unpredictable shocks (Gliner, 
1972; Badia et al., 1979). Unpredictability 
on its own (i.e., without an explicit associa-
tion with an aversive stimulus) may also be 
anxiogenic. In a translational study examin-
ing both a mouse model and healthy human 
participants, Herry et al. (2007) found that 
manipulating the unpredictability of neu-
tral tones increased anxiety-like behaviors. 
Furthermore, this study implicated the 
amygdala, a structure commonly associ-
ated with fear and anxiety (e.g., LaBar et al., 
1998; Davis et al., 2010; Tye et al., 2011), in 
the monitoring of unpredictability. Across 
species evidence of sustained activity in 
the amygdala was interpreted as reflecting 
modified habituation processes to allow 
individuals to remain prepared for action 
in the face of unpredictability.
In addition to temporal unpredictabil-
ity, probabilistic uncertainty also seems to 
modulate anxiety. While different relation-
ships between the probability of aversive 
events and anxiety have been proposed 
when those probabilities are known to the 
subject (e.g., Epstein and Roupenian, 1970; 
Bankart and Elliott, 1974; Loewenstein 
et al., 2001), increased anxiety levels are 
evident when subjects are unaware of 
event contingencies. Sarinopoulos et al. 
(2010) found that, in retrospective esti-
mates, healthy participants overestimated 
how often a cue that ambiguously predicted 
negative stimuli (50% chance of negative 
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 adolescent GAD patients with high intol-
erance of uncertainty (IU) scores showed 
greater activity in the amygdala than controls 
when contrasting “pure” uncertainty (50% 
probability of a correct response) with other 
task conditions. These patients also rated the 
50% probability condition as more anxiety-
provoking than control participants. IU is 
believed to correlate with worry (Dugas 
et al., 1997), a characteristic feature of GAD, 
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders – 4th edn 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
Interestingly, while IU may be positively 
correlated with probabilistic uncertainty, it 
was found to be negatively correlated with 
context-potentiated startle responses in a 
temporally unpredictable context (Nelson 
and Shankman, 2011). College students with 
higher IU scores showed decreased context-
potentiated startle responses. Because high 
IU scores are associated with GAD, this 
supports Grillon et al. (2009) and the idea 
that GAD is not associated with increased 
context-potentiated startle during tempo-
ral unpredictability. Probabilistic uncer-
tainty and temporal unpredictability may, 
therefore, differentially modulate anxiety 
and distinguish different anxiety-related 
disorders. Further work with these clinical 
populations is necessary and could have 
important implications for nosology and 
treatment.
While studies have demonstrated time 
distortions in non-anxious patient popula-
tions (Meck, 1996, 2005; Berlin and Rolls, 
2004; Melgire et al., 2005; Penney et al., 2005; 
Allman and Meck, 2011), examinations of 
how time may be distorted in individuals 
with anxiety disorders are lacking. It is likely 
that time is distorted to a greater extent dur-
ing periods of increased threat and anxiety 
in clinical populations suffering from anxi-
ety disorders than in healthy controls. It is 
also predicted, based on current research on 
unpredictability and uncertainty, that these 
two forms of threat ambiguity may differ-
entially influence time distortions across 
clinical groups and could help further 
characterize the differences between certain 
anxiety-related populations. For example, 
panic and post-traumatic stress disorder 
patients might show greater time distor-
tions resulting from unpredictable stimuli, 
whereas GAD patients might show greater 
distortions resulting from probabilistic 
uncertainty. Such findings would indicate 
of the aversive event resulted in an even 
greater  overestimation of time. These find-
ings suggest that the magnitude of time 
distortion was correlated with the degree 
of anticipatory anxiety experienced by the 
participants. In this study, the cues pre-
dicting an aversive event were always tem-
porally predictable and 100% reinforced. 
Manipulating unpredictability and uncer-
tainty in a similar paradigm by varying the 
anticipation period within participants or 
altering reinforcement probabilities could 
reveal more about the relationship between 
anxiety and time. If unpredictability and 
uncertainty increase aversiveness (Herry 
et al., 2007; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), it may 
be predicted that these anxiety-provoking 
contexts would also increase distortions of 
subjective time.
While the evidence provided above 
implicates both temporal unpredictability 
and probabilistic uncertainty in increased 
anxiety, these two types of ambiguity may 
be functionally dissociable across clinical 
populations. Grillon et al. (2008) found 
that panic disorder patients showed greater 
context-potentiated startle in a temporally 
unpredictable aversive condition compared 
to a predictable condition with temporally 
cued (but probabilistically uncertain) aver-
sive sounds. Similar results were found for 
post-traumatic stress disorder patients using 
a comparable study paradigm (Grillon et al., 
2009). The authors predicted these results 
based on the idea that both disorders are 
characterized by anxiety resulting from 
the unpredictability of aversive events. 
Interestingly, Grillon et al. (2009) found that 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) patients 
did not show the same pattern of anxiety-
like responses, suggesting that the anxiety 
experienced by GAD patients might be qual-
itatively different. It is important to consider 
that while the predictable condition in this 
study was temporally invariant, a probabil-
istic reinforcement rate was used such that 
the cue did not perfectly predict the aversive 
stimulus. It is therefore possible that GAD 
patients had an enhanced aversive response 
to the probabilistic uncertainty associated 
with this cue. Indeed, GAD patients showed 
the highest context-potentiated startle in the 
predictable condition, though this finding 
was not statistically significant. The hypoth-
esis that GAD patients find probabilistic 
uncertainty aversive is indirectly supported 
by Krain et al. (2008), who found that 
stimulus  presentation following cue) was 
followed by an aversive event. In this study, 
increased activity in the amygdala and 
insula was found during ambiguous cues 
relative to cues that perfectly predicted 
negative stimuli. The magnitude of this 
difference was further correlated with the 
degree of overestimation in retrospective 
reports. Ambiguous cues are also associated 
with increased skin conductance responses 
(Grupe and Nitschke, 2011). These results 
suggest that, like unpredictability, individ-
uals find uncertain probabilities aversive. 
Neuroeconomic studies have also provided 
evidence supporting the role of the amyg-
dala (e.g., Hsu et al., 2005) and insula (e.g., 
Preuschoff et al., 2008) in the processing of 
decisions under uncertainty.
While time perception research has 
shown that subjective time is sensitive to 
fear and anxiety (e.g., Campbell and Bryant, 
2007; Bar-Haim et al., 2010), there is a pau-
city of research directly addressing the func-
tion of ambiguity in time distortions. Based 
on the work cited above showing that anxi-
ety is influenced by different types of ambi-
guity, we predict that the experience of time 
may also be sensitive to manipulations of 
threat ambiguity and, specifically of interest 
here, to manipulations of unpredictability 
and uncertainty. Fearful and angry faces, 
which are both considered social indicators 
of threat, tend to be overestimated in time 
(Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 
2010; Tipples, 2011, but see Tipples, 2008). 
Temporal overestimation of fearful faces is 
further modulated by individual differences 
in trait anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2010, but 
see Tipples, 2011). The overestimation of 
fearful faces is particularly relevant in con-
sidering the influence of ambiguity on time 
perception. Whalen (1998) proposed that 
fearful facial expressions are ambiguous 
stimuli in experimental designs because the 
source of threat resulting in the expressed 
fear is unknown to participants. Findings 
indicating that fearful faces increase time 
estimates therefore provide preliminary 
support for the idea that threat ambiguity 
can influence time perception.
In Droit-Volet et al. (2010), partici-
pants judged a probe duration that began 
after a neutral cue or a cue that predicted 
an aversive event. Probe durations were 
overestimated following the threat cue 
compared to the neutral cue and a longer 
anticipation period prior to the delivery 
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distortions in the context of the anticipa-
tion of aversive events, it is equally likely 
that these components of ambiguity may 
also influence time during the anticipation 
of positive events, an additional avenue for 
future research. Overall, there is great prom-
ise in bridging psychological and neurobi-
ological disciplines by addressing current 
topics in the field of emotion to increase 
the value and applicability of time percep-
tion research.
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